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THE HONORABLE ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR.:   
A JUDGE AHEAD OF HIS TIME 
Wayne A. Logan * 
When one thinks about it, it is really quite incredible:  a Brook-
lyn-born son of Lebanese and Irish immigrants with a distinct New 
York accent, standing well under six feet tall, attends a small 
North Carolina college on a basketball scholarship; serves with dis-
tinction in a bombing squadron in World War II; graduates from 
the University of Richmond School of Law (paying his way by serv-
ing as a night librarian); excels at the practice of law in a city (Rich-
mond) not renowned for its receptivity to Yankees; wins election as 
president of the city’s Bar; and upon being appointed to the federal 
bench, serves with distinction for thirty-one years, addressing 
some of the most controversial legal issues of his time with a skill, 
energy, and workhorse determination unknown to most mortals.1 
During his time on the bench, of course, Judge Robert R. 
Merhige, Jr., (“The Judge” to his clerks and extended court family) 
came to enjoy considerable national renown, not only for being a 
progenitor of the Eastern District of Virginia’s “rocket docket” and 
his expeditious resolution of cases when sitting  on assignment,2 
but also for landmark litigation, including the antitrust case in-
volving Westinghouse uranium price-fixing litigation, the Dalkon 
Shield settlement, and events such as the Wounded Knee uprising, 
 
*   Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Law 
Clerk to the Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., 1992–1993. Thanks to Barbara Kaplan for 
her able research assistance and Anna Logan for her expert editorial help.   
 1. See generally RONALD J. BACIGAL, MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
JUDGE ROBERT R. MERHIGE, JR. (1992) (describing the life and accomplishments of Judge 
Merhige).  
 2. Unlike many colleagues on the bench who relished assignments in pleasure spots 
such as the Virgin Islands, Judge Merhige took all comers in need of help, including, during 
my clerkship, the Northern District of Iowa (Cedar Rapids in February!) and the Northern 
District of West Virginia (Martinsburg).  For me, the judicial forays, which could last for 
weeks at a time, were especially enjoyable, as they allowed for extended time with the Judge 
(and of course with court reporter Gil Halasz and clerk of court Rob Walker) after hours.   
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Watergate, the Klan/Nazi-Communist Party violence in Greens-
boro, North Carolina, and the desegregation of Virginia’s public 
schools. 
Here, however, I would like to address a perhaps lesser-known 
and lower-profile aspect of the Judge’s illustrious tenure on the 
bench:  his criminal case docket. During his thirty-one years on the 
bench, Judge Merhige handled countless criminal matters. Using 
dispensed justice as a measure of the magnitude of his work, my 
instinct is that criminal cases, more than civil, constituted the 
lion’s share of the Judge’s direct human impact. Indeed, the 
Judge’s frequent sitting-by-designation was often fueled by the 
need to redress massively backlogged federal criminal dockets. 
Moreover, it is often overlooked that the Judge, before his appoint-
ment to the federal bench by President Johnson in 1967, was re-
garded as one of Virginia’s premier criminal defense lawyers, han-
dling over two hundred homicide cases during his twenty-one years 
as a lawyer, with none of his clients receiving the death penalty.3 
He was, by dint of his extensive trial experience, known by counsel 
coming before him as a “lawyer’s judge,” sensitized to the demands, 
constraints, and strategies of trial lawyers. And he did his job  with 
a wit and charm that kept lawyers on their toes and provided many 
with stories they would later recount with relish.4 
The Judge’s criminal cases encompassed a broad range of varied 
matters, including prison reform litigation and substantive law. In 
those realms, the Judge made significant jurisprudential contribu-
tions.5 In preparing this essay, I spent considerable time on 
 
 3. BACIGAL, supra note 1, at 24.  
 4. I was on the receiving end of this on my first day on the job when one of the parties 
in a case asked in open court for a continuance. The Judge, without missing a beat, feigned 
ignorance about the term’s definition and directed me to retrieve a Black’s Law Dictionary.  
After I quickly located a copy in chambers, I returned to the courtroom to see a twinkle in 
the Judge’s eye indicating that I had joined the ranks of prior neophyte clerks by being the 
target of one of his favorite jokes. See also, e.g., Michael W. Smith, Remembering Judge 
Merhige, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 29, 31 (2005) (recounting the story of a young lawyer appearing 
before the Judge, who “[r]ather than cut [the attorney] off, belittle him, or shatter his confi-
dence . . . remarked: ‘I know you think that I am missing your point, but for $54,000 a year, 
you don’t get John Marshall’”). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Baird, 29 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citing United 
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Merhige, J., sitting by designation) (articu-
lating influential standard regarding defense of official misstatement of the law)); Giarra-
tano v. Murray, 668 F. Supp. 511, 517 (E.D. Va. 1986), rev’d, 836 F.2d 1421 (4th Cir.), aff’d 
on reh’g, 847 F.2d 1118 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), rev’d, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that the 
Commonwealth of Virginia must provide its death row inmates counsel in habeas corpus 
proceedings); Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. 1971) (holding unconsti-
tutional, on Eighth Amendment grounds, the treatment of inmates in a Virginia prison sys-
tem). The Judge also presided over the criminal trial of Allied Chemical Corporation (“Al-
lied”) for the extensive environmental damage to the James River caused by its pesticide 
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Westlaw reviewing cases involving the Judge. Of course, the work 
of a federal trial judge overwhelmingly involves orders and memo-
randa that, despite being the grist and substance of justice dis-
pensed, typically do not make their way into the published or re-
ported oeuvre of the federal judiciary. 
One particular case reported in Westlaw did, however, catch my 
attention. Although the Judge, when sitting by designation on an 
appellate court, often shied away from fracturing a panel otherwise 
consisting of resident judges or writing separately to make a point, 
United States v. Kyllo6 was an exception. In Kyllo, federal agents, 
acting without a search warrant, used  a thermal imager to scan 
the exterior of Kyllo’s home, which revealed differential heat pat-
terns that possibly indicated high intensity interior lights used to 
grow marijuana. The readings, along with other information se-
cured by law enforcement, were used to obtain a search warrant of 
Kyllo’s house, which revealed a marijuana growing operation.7 
After some procedural wrangling, the trial court eventually 
backed the government’s warrantless thermal scan, which pre-
sented the Judge’s panel (also consisting of Judges Hawkins and 
Noonan) with a question of first impression in the Ninth Circuit: 
whether a thermal scan qualifies as a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, requiring a search warrant.8 Applying the Katz two-
part test,9 Judge Merhige, writing for himself and Judge Noonan, 
concluded that Kyllo possessed “a subjective expectation of privacy 
that activities conducted within his home would be private.”10 In 
doing so, the Judge rejected the position of four other circuits that 
held that the scan simply revealed non-private “waste heat” ema-
nating from the house.11 With regard to the second part of the Katz 
 
Kepone, resulting in what was then the largest criminal fine for water pollution ever as-
sessed. The Judge, after imposing the maximum penalty, offered Allied a creative alterna-
tive to simple payment of the fine to the federal treasury: he allowed a reduction in the fine 
if Allied agreed to fund an $8 million endowment to improve the environment. BACIGAL, 
supra note 1, at 116.  
 6. 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998), op. withdrawn by United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 
1059 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 7. Id. at 1251.  
 8. Id. at 1252. 
 9. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 10. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253.   
 11. Id. The cases were:  United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 854, 857 (5th Cir.), pet. for reh’g denied, 53 
F.3d 1283 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 
668, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058 (8th Cir. 1994). 
But see United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1502 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other 
grnds., 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).    
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test, again rejecting the position of other circuits,12 the Judge wrote 
that Kyllo’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively rea-
sonable because the imager revealed details “sufficiently ‘intimate’ 
to give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation.”13 Citing a prior 
Tenth Circuit decision on the question (later vacated on other 
grounds),14 Judge Merhige concluded that: 
It is not disputed whether the [imager] could reveal details such as 
intimate activities in a bedroom. . . . Even assuming that the [imager 
used], apparently a relatively unsophisticated thermal imager, is un-
able to reveal such intimate details, technology improves at a rapid 
pace, and much more powerful and sophisticated thermal imagers are 
being developed which are increasingly able to reveal the intimacies 
that we have heretofore trusted take place in private absent a valid 
search warrant legitimizing their observation.15 
Moreover, even if the imager did not reveal intimate details such 
as sexual activity, the Judge reasoned that it could reveal a range 
of other activities such as the “use of showers and bathtubs, ovens, 
washers and dryers, and any other household appliance that emits 
heat. . . . Even the routine and trivial activities conducted in our 
homes are sufficiently ‘intimate’ as to give rise to Fourth Amend-
ment violation if observed by law enforcement without a war-
rant.”16 Because use of the imager by law enforcement qualified as 
a search, the matter was remanded to determine whether other 
information, exclusive of the improperly obtained thermal images, 
established probable cause to issue a warrant.17 
Judge Hawkins dissented, concluding that “the thermal imaging 
device employed . . . intruded into nothing,” and urged the panel to 
“follow the lead of our sister circuits and hold that the use of ther-
mal imaging technology does not constitute a search under contem-
porary Fourth Amendment standards.”18 
The government thereafter successfully petitioned for rehear-
ing, Judge Merhige’s opinion was withdrawn, and in its place came 
 
 12. Kyllo, 140 F.3d at 1253–54 (citing Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330; Ishmael, 48 F.3d at 
855–56; Myers, 46 F.3d at 669–70; Pinson, 24 F.3d at 1059).  
 13. Id. at 1254.  
 14. Id. (citing Cusumano, 67 F.3d at 1504).  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. at 1255.  
 17. See id.  
 18. Id. (Hawkins, J., dissenting).  
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a decision reaching the opposite result, authored by Judge Haw-
kins.19 Siding with all other circuits that to that point had defini-
tively resolved the question,20 Judge Hawkins, writing for himself 
and Judge Brunetti21 (Judge Noonan, siding with Judge Merhige’s 
opinion in the earlier iteration, was on the new panel but dis-
sented),22 concluded that “[w]hatever the ‘Star Wars’ capabilities 
this technology may possess in the abstract, the thermal imaging 
device employed here intruded into nothing.”23 
Certiorari was thereafter successfully sought, and  the Supreme 
Court ultimately reversed by a 5-4 vote.24 In a clear vindication of 
Judge Merhige’s original opinion, using strikingly similar lan-
guage, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that Kyllo possessed a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding “the interior of [his] 
home” because “[i]n the home, . . . all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government 
eyes.”25 Taking the “long view,” similar to Judge Merhige, the Kyllo 
majority opinion expressed concern that citizens would otherwise 
be placed “at the mercy of advancing technology—including imag-
ing technology that could discern all human activity in the home. 
While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, 
the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated systems 
that are already in use or in development.”26 The majority, how-
ever, closed by adding an additional requirement that the device in 
question must not be in “general public use” for Fourth Amend-
ment privacy protection to attach,27 a highly problematic standard 
justifiably condemned by the four-member dissenting opinion au-
thored by Justice Stevens. As noted by the dissent, the protection 
“dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is ‘in general public 
 
 19. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1045 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (panel consisting 
of Hawkins, Noonan, and Brunetti, J.J.) (“We note that a previously filed disposition of this 
appeal was withdrawn.”).   
 20. As noted above, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497 (10th 
Cir. 1995) concluded that use of a thermal imager constituted a search, but the decision was 
vacated on rehearing en banc on another basis without reaching the question. See United 
States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996) (en banc).  
 21. See Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1043 n.1 (“Judge Brunetti has been drawn to replace the 
Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr., Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia, in this case.”). 
 22. See id. at 1047 (Noonan, J., dissenting). 
 23. Id. at 1046.  
 24. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 41 (2001).  
 25. Id. at 34, 37. With characteristically colorful language, Justice Scalia offered that 
the thermal imager “might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the lady of the 
house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate’ . . . .” 
Id. at 38.  
 26. Id. at 35–36, 40.  
 27. Id. at 40.  
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use’ . . . ,” a standard that “is somewhat perverse because it seems 
likely that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as 
the use of intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.”28 
Indeed, today, Kyllo likely would come out differently because of 
the widespread public use of thermal imaging  devices.29 
If only the Supreme Court had left well enough alone and fol-
lowed Judge Merhige’s simpler and more constrained view. That 
the Judge should opine in such enlightened fashion on a matter 
involving technological advancement is a rich irony: I recall many 
times when he expressed frustration and wonder at not being able 
to operate devices (a deficiency I share). The larger point, however, 
is that the Judge in Kyllo, as he did so many other times in his 
illustrious career on the bench, sagely anticipated the future arc of 
justice. On critically important issues such as workers’ rights,30 
gender discrimination,31 consensual homosexual sodomy,32 as well 
as the difficulties presented by excess prosecutorial authority vis-
à-vis plea bargaining33 and the life-altering effect of collateral con-
sequences,34 he was a jurist ahead of his time. And for that, the 
nation’s jurisprudence—and the citizens that secure liberty and 
protection from it—are in Judge Merhige’s debt. 
 
 28. Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 29. This is evidenced by a simple query of “thermal imaging device” on Amazon.com.    
 30. See Cohen v. Chesterfield Cty. Sch. Bd., 326 F. Supp. 1159 (E.D. Va. 1971) (holding 
unconstitutional a Chesterfield County school policy prohibiting teachers from working past 
their fifth month of pregnancy).   
 31. See Gilbert v. Gen. Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974) (holding that an 
employer’s practice of excluding sickness and accident benefits from pregnancy related dis-
abilities was unlawful sex discrimination).  
 32. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Attorney for City of Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 
1975) (Merhige, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion’s view that a statute 
making sodomy a crime was constitutional).   
 33. See National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers Holds First Institute, 14 CRIM. L. 
REP. (BNA) 2001, 2326 (1973) (citing the Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr.) (“[M]any federal 
charges are multiplied for bargaining purposes. For instance . . . one bad social security 
check can lead to 10 federal counts.”).  
 34. See Marston v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Va. 1971), rev’d, 485 F.2d 705 (4th 
Cir. 1973).   
